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Sub Questions:
• Is it financially viable to recover marine debris?
• Is it economically viable to recover marine debris?
• Can adjusted unit value transfer be used to estimate the damages of marine debris?
Abstract
Marine plastics inflict annual damages of nearly $2bn on the marine economy.
These damages may now be mitigated by a novel scheme that proposes to
recover marine plastics. While a range of uses exist for recovered marine
plastics; this research finds that none are profitable. While not financially
viable, the scheme is found to be economically viable given the significant
damages from marine plastics on the marine economy. Implications from this
research for the future of pollution abatement are remarked upon.
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Introduction
The 620% rise in plastic production since 1975 has been accompanied by
an increased volume of plastics in the world’s oceans (Jambeck et al., 2005).
Indeed, of the estimated 6.4 million tonnes of marine debris that enter the
oceans annually, between 60 and 80% is believed to be plastic (Derraik, 2002).
Once in the ocean, marine plastics inflict adverse effects on both marine life,
via ingestion, entanglement and leached chemicals (Azzarello and Van-Vleet,
1987), and the marine economy, via damaged vessels, lost fishing and reduced
tourism (Jambeck et al., 2005). While there is some ambiguity about how
fatal plastics are to marine life, there is considerable support for the view
that marine plastic inflicts significant damages on a range of sectors in the
marine economy (McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule, 2011). Therefore, to abate
the damages caused by the growth in plastic production, some method of
recovering marine plastics must be sought.
To recover marine plastics, a variety of methods have been proposed.
The most notable of these was devised by a new start-up, called ‘The Ocean
Cleanup’ (‘TOC’), that developed a novel technology that purports to be able
to recover floating marine plastics. The technology essentially uses a boom,
deployed across the North Pacific, to force marine plastics to converge and
accumulate in the area of the boom. The boom may then recover floating
plastics and store them, ready for transport to shore. Once ashore, recovered
marine plastics may be used in a manner of ways, such as generating oil
(pyrolysis), electricity (waste-to-energy) or new plastics (recycling) and TOC
believes that these uses may be profitable. However, this research fails to
support this assertion and instead notes that the low market prices of oil,
electricity and plastics cannot support the high operating costs of this scheme.
While the operating costs exceed the revenues, the economic benefits
also exceed the costs. This suggests a duality in the viability of TOC whereby
the scheme is shown to be economically but not financially viable. This
result was found by conducting a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of the scheme.
CBA was used first to determine financial viability and then extended to
explore economic viability. To determine financial viability, the expenses were
updated from a prior feasibility study on TOC and then compared to revenues
estimated using market prices. To determine economic viability, these costs
and benefits were augmented by a calculation of the avoided damages from
marine debris. To estimate marine debris damages, previous estimates of
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marine debris damages were subject to adjusted unit value-transfer. This
technique has been commonly used to ascertain valuations where primary
data is not available or previous estimates are inexact (Brouwer and Spaninks,
1999). Additionally, once adjusted, new values were discounted and subject
to sensitivity analysis to increase the accuracy and validity of the estimates.
The estimates produced can be summarised by a ratio of financial costs to
revenues of 1:24, implying the scheme is not financially viable, and a ratio of
economic costs to benefits of 1:2, implying the scheme is economically viable.
The implications of this duality are explored with regards to suitable funding
models.
This research is organised as follows. Firstly, a review of the literature
suggests uncertainty about the effects of marine debris and how to possibly
mitigate them and the TOC scheme was selected to mitigate them. To examine
TOC’s financial and economic viability, an appropriate method was designed
given the restrictions of no primary data and scarcity of secondary data. This
method was implemented in the results section which details the financial and
economic costs and benefits of the scheme. Finally, comment was made on the
limitations and implications of this research.
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Literature Review
This section explores the literature on the effects, control, types and
uses of marine debris. Marine debris may enter the oceans either as industrial
eﬄuent (Roberts and Spence, 1976), mismanaged consumer waste (Azzarello
and Van-Vleet, 1987), or from dumping at sea (Hammer, Kraak and Parsons,
2012). Once in the ocean, there are three main effects of marine debris on
marine life; ingestion, entanglement and leaching. Additionally, there are three
main effects of marine debris on the marine economy; damage to vessels, lost
fish stocks, and reduced tourism (McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011), Mouat,
Lozano and Bateson (2010)). However, there is considerable uncertainty in
the literature regarding the magnitude of these effects. This section, therefore,
reviews the literature in this area. This review is then expanded to review the
literature in the related areas of how to control and use marine debris.
Effects of marine debris
Ingestion.
This section discusses the effects of marine debris on marine life. The
most well-known danger is that of ingestion. For marine life that mistakes
marine plastics for their typical diet, there are two significant dangers of
ingestion. Firstly, large items may occlude both respiratory and digestive
tracts leading to starvation or asphyxiation. However, the likelihood of this
danger is low as a majority of marine plastics are small industrial pellets or
fragment at sea and so cannot cause such harm at the reduced size (Karlsson
et al. (2018), Robards, Piatt and Wohl (1995)). The second danger is, however,
more fatal. Once ingested, plastics are digested exceptionally slowly which
can leach toxic chemicals into the body. However, this effect is uncertain as
there is insufficient evidence thus far to corroborate this suggestion (Azzarello
and Van-Vleet, 1987). Additionally, decade-long surveys by Moser and Lee
(1992) and Robards, Piatt and Wohl (1995) both failed to report any adverse
health issues from ingestion. While these two studies only observed seabirds,
a wide-ranging survey undertaken by Azzarello and Van-Vleet (1987) reported
the following conclusion:
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“Although many of these potential hazards lie in the realm of
conjecture, we believe that it is important to work toward preven-
tion or prediction of these problems before the actual effects have
been realised.” (Azzarello and Van-Vleet, 1987, p. 301)
While the fatality of ingestion is ambiguous, the frequency and volume
of plastics ingested is more certain. Moser and Lee (1992) produced strong
evidence for this as they reported on the same population of seabirds in
1969-77 and 1978-85, and found that the frequency of ingestion had risen by
30% and the volume of plastics ingested had risen 80%. This evidence was
further corroborated by Robards, Piatt and Wohl (1995) who also reported
a statistically significant increase in both frequency and volume of ingested
plastics between 1968-77. Additionally, Robards, Piatt and Wohl (1995) noted
a significant difference in the likelihood of seabirds ingesting marine plastics
in the Atlantic and the Pacific which implies that the increasing danger of
ingesting marine plastics has grown inconsistently across the worlds oceans.
Robards, Piatt and Wohl (1995) attributed this increasing but inconsistent
danger of ingestion to an increase in the frequency and volume of marine plastics
in the ocean. Jambeck et al. (2005) noted this growth as being consistent
with the trends in global plastic production. Therefore, the increasing rate of
ingestion is clearly linked to the increasing concentration of marine plastics
(Lebreton et al., 2018). This implies support for a scheme that would reduce
the concentration of marine plastics and therefore reverse the current increasing
trends of ingestion.
Entanglement.
Another danger from marine debris is that of entanglement. Once
entangled, marine life may suffer either strangulation or starvation. Unlike
the dangers from ingestion, these effects have been commonly observed as
the rates of species suffering from entanglement (40%) is notably higher than
those suffering from ingestion (30%) (Allsopp et al., 2007). While it is unlikely
that a majority of marine plastics will entangle marine life due to fragmented
size, there are more types of marine debris than plastic. Specifically, discarded
fishing gear, or ghost nets, are a common type of marine debris that are
responsible for a majority of marine life suffering entanglement. Ghost nets
were initially designed to entangle marine life and continue to do so when
discarded (Henderson, 2001). They are discarded either accidentally or dumped
after losing economic value. This loss of economic value suggests that recovering
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ghost nets cannot be profitable. Therefore it is unlikely that ghost nets would
be recovered by the private sector which would have reduced entanglement.
However, as previously noted, there is a significant loss to marine life caused by
entanglement which suggests recovery of them is warranted. This dichotomy
between damages and viability is explored in greater depth later.
Leaching.
A final notable danger from marine debris on marine life is that of leaching
chemicals. Once exposed to a range of factors including weathering, oxidation
and UV radiation, marine plastics have been observed to leach chemicals. The
chemicals leached may be part of their design, such as dyes or fire-retardants,
or may be adsorbed from the water. In highly concentrated areas of marine
debris, chemicals now banned for their toxicity, such as PCB and DDT (Harse,
2011), may still be present and may be adsorbed by new marine debris in the
area. Once adsorbed and then leached, the dangers of reduced water quality
and ingesting marine plastics are exacerbated. Once ingested, the process of
digestion implies plastics beginning to leach contaminants which are likely
to induce significant health risks. These health risks may be transmitted
through the food chain. However, with only 30% of species ingesting plastics,
this effect is likely to be limited (Allsopp et al., 2007) and even then there
is little supporting evidence for the existence of this effect (Azzarello and
Van-Vleet, 1987). Additionally, the dangers from reduced water quality may
still abound although significant health effects of reduced water quality due to
marine pollution have not yet been reported. However, this is tempered by
the observation from Harse (2011) that:
“No fish-monger on earth could sell you a certified-organic wild-
caught fish” (Harse, 2011, p. 341)
Therefore, the leaching of plastics in the ocean is a threat to marine
life. However, it is potentially possible to mitigate this threat. It should be
noted that while only 15% of marine debris floats, 80% of that is plastic of
which 90% is the necessary type to float in water (Sudhakar et al. (2007),
Derraik (2002)). Therefore it is fair to suggest that a majority of plastics
float. Floating plastics are more easily recovered by mitigation schemes such
as TOC. However, as they float, they are also more exposed to the range of
conditions that degrade them significantly enough to start leaching chemicals.
Therefore the scheme is most likely to recover those plastics that are most at
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risk of or have already begun, leaching chemicals. Furthermore, Sudhakar et al.
(2007) noted that plastics might retain a degree of economic value even when
significantly degraded and therefore it is possible that it may be financially
as well as economically viable to recover floating plastics (Hammer, Kraak
and Parsons, 2012). The implications of this finding from the literature are
discussed more fully later, but for now, a discussion of the dangers of marine
debris on the marine economy is merited.
Damages to economy.
The discussion above has made it eminently clear that there is a range
of threats from marine debris to marine life. These effects also inflict damages
on the marine economy. Specifically, the problems of ingestion, entanglement
and leaching effectively reduce fish stocks which therefore reduce the catch and
revenue of the fishing economy (Azzarello and Van-Vleet, 1987). These losses
are so severe that Mouat, Lozano and Bateson (2010) reported that the Scottish
fishing fleet lost an estimated 5% of their total annual revenue to marine debris.
While the Scottish fishing fleet faces marine debris in the Atlantic Ocean,
and the North Sea so is more exposed to these effects, their experience is not
atypical with Takehama (1990) reporting damages to the Japanese fishing fleet
also in the millions of dollars. Whether this was comparable to the 5% of
annual revenue figure is unclear, but the finding of significant damages from
marine debris is consistent.
Further dangers to the marine economy were evident from Mouat, Lozano
and Bateson (2010) and McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) who both
reported that a range of sectors suffered from marine debris including fishing,
as discussed above, but also vessels and tourism. Specifically, the most frequent
damage suffered was that on equipment and vessels while the most significant
damage was the estimated losses suffered by the tourism industry. Lost tourism
revenues represent a significant cost to coastal populations despite their limited
exposure to marine debris as only 15% of marine debris washing ashore as
beach debris (Derraik, 2002). Once ashore, beach debris reduces aesthetic
value of an area imposing a cost in lost revenue. The cost was so significant
that just a 25% reduction in beach debris was predicted to yield approximately
$30mn in benefits to the local area. While the magnitude of this effect may
be disputed as their results were based on the very popular Orange County
USA area, the finding that marine debris reduces tourism is a common one in
the literature (Mouat, Lozano and Bateson, 2010). Therefore it is clear that
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marine debris imposes significant costs on a range of sectors in the marine
economy. Specifically, losses to fishing and tourism highlight the significant
economic impacts of marine debris.
The discussion above has outlined the various adverse effects of marine
debris on both marine life and economy. This implies that it is necessary to
recover marine debris to mitigate these damages. The following discussion
reviews the literature on plausible methods of mitigating marine debris.
Control of marine debris
Legislation.
Efforts to legislate marine debris have thus far been ineffective in part
due to the challenges of the international nature of marine debris and the
link to economic growth. As economic growth is accompanied by increased
production and waste, there is an active link between economic growth and
marine debris which dissuades developing countries from regulation who are
loathed to sacrifice economic growth in favour of environmental protection
(Jambeck et al., 2005). Furthermore, the challenges of international coopera-
tion and enforcement have hampered previous efforts. The effect of this was
that current legislation has ineffectively focused on the input rather than the
stock of marine debris (Amos, 1993). An illustrative example is MARPOL
Annex V, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, which came into force in 1989 and regulated the dumping of waste from
ships at sea. However, the effect of this regulation has not been uniformly
acclaimed in the literature. Henderson (2001) found no statistically significant
difference in entanglement rates from 1987-1996 despite the legislation begin-
ning in 1989. Henderson (2001) studied Hawaiian monk seals which reside on
Hawaiian Islands which are proximate to where TOC will deploy. However,
two limitations to their study exist. Firstly, they did not observe any fish,
whales, or birds in their study as other entanglement studies have done (Laist,
1997). Secondly, they did not cover entanglement rates at sea. This is crucial
as the frequency of illegal dumping is higher at sea, and so their sample had
a priori limited exposure to entanglements. However, this was a purposive
sample selection as the use of an island based sample is instructive both for
quantifying the risks to land-based life from marine debris and also as the
justification for the clean up of beaches. However, their finding of no significant
difference in entanglement rates pre and post-legislation is evidence of some
success. As entanglement rates have risen sharply, commensurate with the
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growth in plastic production and marine debris (Jambeck et al., 2005), finding
no increased rate of entanglement could suggest that the legislation had some
small effect as entanglement rates should have risen if there was indeed no
effect (Laist, 1997). Therefore there is insufficient evidence to conclude that
this legislation had any significant effect on illegal dumping of marine debris
and resultant entanglement rates and losses of marine life.
Beaches.
Beach cleanups, volunteer efforts to recover beach debris, have thus far
proved to be the most popular method of recovering marine debris (The Ocean
Cleanup, 2014). Beach debris reduces the aesthetic value of an area, reducing
tourism, and reduces the quality of the beach, reducing health (Leggett et al.,
2014). The effect on tourism is significant despite beach debris representing
only 15% of total (Derraik, 2002). Therefore, controlling beach debris can be
characterised as an investment in the local economy (Leggett et al., 2014). The
return on this investment is significant with Leggett et al. (2014) estimating
that a 25% reduction in beach debris in Orange County USA would yield a
$32.2 million benefit to the local economy. However, the cost of achieving such
a reduction is uncertain. With volunteers, the recovery cost per kilogram of
waste recovered can be incredibly low which suggests that it may be profitable
to run such schemes. Profitability here refers to both the sale of recovered
plastics and in increased or maintained tourist revenues. This suggests an
essential difference between financial and economic viability which is explored
further later. However, such cleanups are also slow, laborious and require a
significant amount of manpower to make the clean up worthwhile. Therefore,
it is unlikely that a labour force sufficient to cover the sheer scale of coastline
affected may be consistently found unless they are paid which increases the
costs of running the operation. Paid efforts are familiar with local authorities
in the UK reporting the expenditure of more than $35,000 annually to keep
areas clear of beach debris (Mouat, Lozano and Bateson, 2010). However, the
efficiency of this method is debatable. Specifically, Leggett et al. (2014) noted
that within three months, there had been a 50% return to the original level
of beach debris which implies repeated expense while the source of debris is
unaffected. Furthermore, beach debris represents only 15% of the total stock
thus suggesting a limited impact from beach cleanups. Finally, this method
abates damages to tourism more strongly than any other sector, despite other
sectors, such as fishing and shipping, also significantly being affected by marine
debris. This suggests that it is not a practical solution to the more significant
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problem of marine debris.
Drones.
To mitigate the damages of marine debris via recovery of marine plastics
at sea, several proposals have been made. One of the most innovative of these
suggests using autonomous drones. The drone concept proposes using several
small vessels remotely or automatically salvaging marine plastics and then
returning to a set drop-off location afterwards. The main advantage of this
scheme is flexibility in targeting recovery efforts (The Ocean Cleanup, 2014).
Possession of a small fleet of drones allows more heavily concentrated areas or
areas of higher risk to be specifically targeted. The possibility of responding
to localised events, such as the millions of tonnes of debris washed out by the
tsunami in Japan (Jambeck et al., 2005), also arises. Another considerable
advantage to the drone concept is the notion of autonomy. As drones may
be automatic and solar panel fuelled, they require a low degree of human
interaction, reducing operating costs. However, several drawbacks persist.
Firstly, design and repairs to such a fleet could prove both challenging and
costly if the drones frequently break or overload in the notoriously challenging
conditions in the ocean such as strong currents and highly concentrated areas
of marine debris. Furthermore, each drone would have to recover a certain
amount of plastic per operation for it to be profitable and therefore a tension
arises between the operational limits of remote control, the battery capacity,
and the profitable level of operation. These criticisms are also compounded
by considerable uncertainty regarding the questions of how large should each
drone be, how should each drone capture only marine plastics and where and
how would each drone return to after cleaning an area. So despite the futuristic
nature of this suggestion, it is fraught with challenges (The Ocean Cleanup,
2014).
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Vessels.
Discarding the drone concept as insufficiently specified leaves two further
noteworthy options. Either large manned vessels or use of passive systems.
The former has been labelled as fishing for litter (KIMO, 2014). Operated in
the North Sea by KIMO, this scheme pays fisherman for marine debris they
recover as part of their regular fishing activities (KIMO, 2014). Indeed, with
86% of fishing vessels reporting marine debris contaminated bycatch (Mouat,
Lozano and Bateson, 2010), this is likely to be a popular scheme in the fishing
industry. Indeed the preliminary trial evidence is also supportive of the scheme,
although this was found only on a small-scale trial which had governmental
support (KIMO, 2014). Governmental support for this scheme is warranted by
the fact that it has shown, thus far, that it is effective at recovering all kinds
of marine debris, including the low financial but high economic value ghost
nets. These may not always be plastic or have resale value, and so revenues
from them are likely to be inefficiently low. Additionally, with average costs
of just under $2.54 per kilo of waste collected (The Ocean Cleanup (2014),
KIMO (2014)), inefficiently low revenues for the scheme predicate the scheme
being financially infeasible. However, the high damages suffered from marine
life becoming entangled in ghost nets suggests that recovering them may
be at least economically viable if not financially (Azzarello and Van-Vleet,
1987). To adapt to this duality, there is some suggestion that governments
could support the scheme by hypothecating some new revenue stream towards
funding such a scheme. A new revenue stream could hypothetically be from
market-based instruments for control of marine plastics which would be an
example of environmentally proactive policy (Dikgang, 2012). While this is
theoretically possible, a more likely degree of government support would be
aiding the scheme in managing recovered marine debris. Specifically, existing
waste management infrastructure, particularly waste-to-energy plants (DEFRA,
2014), could theoretically accept marine debris as well as municipal waste.
This would provide a specific, consistent use for recovered marine debris.
It is, however, uncertain whether this scheme is viable. Specifically, three
severe disadvantages persist for the scheme. Firstly, recovery of plastics is
much more challenging for regular fishing activities given that a majority of
plastics, 70% (Derraik, 2002), sink and are therefore irrecoverable (Derraik,
2002). Secondly, fish has an established market while recovered marine debris
does not which is a disincentive to fishing for them. Even among the uses for
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recovered plastics, there is also a high degree of uncertainty regarding their
market value due to the effect of degradation at sea reducing their suitability
for a range of economic uses (Sudhakar et al., 2007). Thirdly, calculations by
KIMO (2014) reveal that the total catch of all the fishing for litter trials is
too low to have any significant impact on the amounts of marine debris in
the ocean. Therefore, the fishing for litter scheme does have some merit as
being economically viable although it is too small a scale and too costly to
be financially viable. The small-scale relegates its applicability to the broader
problem of marine debris. This finding leaves one viable option for clean up,
the design of a passive system which may passively recover marine plastics.
The Ocean Cleanup.
The TOC scheme is one such passive system which is the focus of this
research. The TOC project suggests the construction, essentially, of a large-
scale boom which passively sits in an area of highly concentrated marine debris.
Once there, floating plastics are forced to converge to a single point where they
are then recovered and stored. Infrequently, a manned ship would recover the
stored debris and transport it to land for marketing. Predictably, the main
challenges to this scheme are in the technical design of such a boom. Assuming
this can be surmounted, indeed reports consequent to the feasibility study
suggest that this is a valid assumption (The Ocean Cleanup, 2014), then the
scheme’s central costs would be the transportation of recovered waste from the
boom to a land-based site. This suggests that TOC could operate at much
lower cost and much larger scale than the previously discussed alternatives.
However, there are some notable disadvantages. Firstly, TOC proposed
only recovering floating plastics which restricts the recovery efforts to the 15%
of marine debris that floats (Derraik, 2002). While this ignores the 70% of
marine debris that sinks, it is likely a profitable move as the higher value
plastics are those that typically float (The Ocean Cleanup, 2014). Therefore,
a drawback to the scheme is that it will have a limited effect on the 70% of
marine debris that sinks which implies that the scheme will have a limited
effect in mitigating the economic impacts of marine debris (Derraik, 2002).
However, this is addressed by stating that floating plastics are those most likely
to be ingested as they are easier to see for marine life when at the surface, and
also most likely to leach chemicals as there are stronger degradation factors on
the surface (Azzarello and Van-Vleet (1987), Harse (2011)). This suggests that
while only 15% of debris may be recovered, this represents the most dangerous
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proportion of marine debris. It should also be noted that 15% of marine debris
that may be recovered by TOC may not necessarily be plastics. This implies
that some method of sorting is required as recovered plastics must be examined
for their suitability for the market. Specifically, pyrolysis and recycling require
low levels of degradation while waste-to-energy and landfill have much lower
requirements (Sudhakar et al., 2007). Furthermore, contaminants and by-catch
must further be eradicated from recovered marine debris to ensure maximum
yield and profit from the recovery of marine debris. Such checks on recovered
marine debris increase the costs of the scheme. Given these costs and the
uncertain costs of the necessary research and design for the scheme, the cost
of recovery is likely to be significant using TOC which casts doubt on the
profitability of recovering marine plastics.
Types of marine debris
With regards to the profitability of recovering marine plastics, it is
instructive to explore the types of marine debris that might be recovered.
Within the 60-80% of marine debris that is estimated to be plastic (Derraik,
2002), three categories of plastics emerge; floating and recyclable, floating and
unrecyclable, and sinking. While only 15% of marine debris floats (Robards,
Piatt and Wohl, 1995), this category is comprised of the most commonly
produced plastics, Polyethylene (‘PE’), polypropylene (‘PP’) and polystyrene
(‘PS’). With regards to the frequency of these plastics, sample evidence suggests
that 90% of marine plastics are polyethylene (‘PE’), distantly followed by
polypropylene (‘PP’) (Karlsson et al., 2018). The source of these plastics are
both industrial, with Karlsson et al. (2018) noting that billions of PE pellets
might be found in industrial eﬄuent, and commercial, with Kothari, Tyagi
and Pathak (2010), noting that all three types are commonly used for goods
packaging. Regardless of the source, once these plastics enter the ocean, they
float and thus pose a threat to seabirds and fish via ingestion. However, as they
float, this threat may be more easily mitigated as floating plastics are more
accessible to observe and recover. Recovery of these plastics is essential as PE,
PP and PS are all suitable for recycling alongside pyrolysis and waste-to-energy
uses which suggests a degree of profitability to their recovery (Psomopoulos,
Bourka and Themelis, 2009). This further implies that management of these
may be integrated easily into existing waste management infrastructure. This
is discussed in greater detail later, but for now, it suffices to note that these
plastics are the most common, the most valuable, and the most recoverable.
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The second category of marine plastics is predominantly polyvinyl chlo-
ride (‘PVC’, often used in construction). PVC floats in water similarly to PE
although has lower financial value. Specifically, The Ocean Cleanup (2014)
reports that there are limitations to PVC’s viability for pyrolysis and the
low number of times it may be recycled. This implies that it has a lower
financial value than the first group. This lower financial value is compounded
by the need to ascertain the value of recovered PVC which would require some
form of screening which adds to the cost of recovery (The Ocean Cleanup,
2014). This higher cost and lower value compared to the first group implies
reduced financial viability to its recovery. However, this distinction is not
practical as with both PE and PVC floating it is not feasible to recover only
the valuable PE at the expense of the dubiously valued PVC. Additionally, as
PVC has been observed to leach chemicals more quickly than other plastics,
there is added impetus to its recovery (Sudhakar et al., 2007). The degradation
implies reduced financial value to its recovery although the increased damages
threatened by degraded plastics imply an increased economic necessity of its
recovery. Indeed this dichotomy between financial and economic viability is a
critical theme in this research. To summarise, PVC is less financially viable to
recover but is more economically viable (The Ocean Cleanup, 2014).
Finally, a third group of marine plastics exist which mainly includes
Polyurethane (‘PU’). PU sinks in water and cannot be used for either pyrolysis
or recycling. The lack of commercial use for PU implies little to no financial
value. This low value has the effect of disincentivising the necessary develop-
ments required for the scheme to be able to recover sunk plastics given the
depth of the Pacific (The Ocean Cleanup, 2014). Finally, it should be noted
that while sunk plastics are less exposed to degradation, they are more likely
to inflict damages on lower level marine life, so it is at least, somewhat econom-
ically sensible to recover such plastics. In conclusion, sunk plastics, while rare,
are unlikely to be recovered due to low cost and technical limitations. This
concludes the discussion of marine plastic types although it is now necessary
to discuss the proportion of marine debris which comes not from plastics but
ghost nets.
A sizeable proportion of marine debris is not, however, plastic as detailed
above, but discarded fishing gear, referred to previously as ghost nets (Hammer,
Kraak and Parsons, 2012). The discussion on legislation of marine debris has
already discussed how ghost nets are dumped at sea due to low economic value
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(Henderson, 2001). Once they have lost value, fishing vessels, in particular,
may dump or lose ghost nets, which represents an abundant source of marine
debris (Marsden Jacob, 2009a). Indeed the volume of ghost nets in the ocean
has increased recently with a growth in the fishing industry (Amos (1993),
Johnson (1994)). The impacts of ghost nets on the marine economy are to
entangle all manner of marine life which devastates fish stocks. Fish in highly
concentrated areas of marine debris are effectively being fished by ghost nets
without any fishing activity occurring. These dangers are exacerbated by
ghost nets transporting invasive or dangerous species across layers of the water
column (Derraik, 2002). However, this has not yet been observed on a large
scale (Azzarello and Van-Vleet, 1987). Finally, these dangers are compounded
by the estimated 50-year lifespan of ghost nets and the lack of incentive to
recover these nets. This is because as the material degrades the nets are
not worth keeping for vessels which then dump them at sea. Therefore it is
unlikely that any financial value may be realised from recovering ghost nets,
implying that cleanup efforts are unlikely to address this issue (Marsden Jacob
(2009a), Hammer, Kraak and Parsons (2012), Henderson (2001), Azzarello and
Van-Vleet (1987)).
This review has so far explored a range of impacts from marine debris, a
range of mitigating options and the range of debris to be found. What remains
to be discussed is the range of uses for recovered marine debris once recovered.
Uses for marine debris
Pyrolysis.
The first main use for marine debris is pyrolysis, the process of turning
plastics into oils. Pyrolysis transforms recovered plastics into crude oil for use,
sale or refinement. The decision to use, sell or refine the oil is dependent on the
comparison of refinement costs to oil prices. Oil prices are notoriously volatile
however which introduces a significant degree of uncertainty for this. Further
uncertainty arises about the viability of using pyrolysis for marine debris as not
all types and quality of marine debris are suitable for pyrolysis. While the most
common PE, PP and PS types are usually acceptable, this is provided that they
not be significantly degraded, else they must be discarded introducing a loss
(Sudhakar et al., 2007). Furthermore, the more infrequently recovered PVC is
not typically accepted for pyrolysis nor is non-plastic marine debris such as
ghost nets, which physically cannot be used for pyrolysis but are responsible
for the majority of losses of marine life to entanglement, (The Ocean Cleanup,
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2014). This illustrates that pyrolysis is only a valid option for plastics and
not other types of marine debris which would else have to be landfilled and
therefore this is a less efficient use for recovered debris. Furthermore, these
restrictions reduce the effective yield from recovery which reduces estimated
profits (Fivga and Dimitriou, 2018). Another factor that reduces profits is a
scarcity of such plants. As pyrolysis can only be used for plastics, there are few
pyrolysis plants available, and therefore there is limited scope for integrating
marine debris management with existing waste management infrastructure
(Psomopoulos, Bourka and Themelis, 2009). This scarcity of plants may also
increase the costs of recovery if debris requires transportation to more efficient
plants and more profitable markets. To conclude, there is a significant degree
of uncertainty regarding the viability of using pyrolysis for recovered marine
debris.
Waste-To-Energy.
A similar but less restrictive option to pyrolysis is called Waste-To-Energy
(WTE) which proposes that recovered plastics be incinerated to generate elec-
tricity for use and sale. WTE is preferred to pyrolysis as a higher amount of
recovered marine debris could be used in a WTE plant than a comparable py-
rolysis plant. This is because the pyrolysis equivalent may only use sufficiently
non-degraded plastics whereas WTE may accept nearly all types of waste
(DEFRA, 2014). Furthermore, as WTE plants are currently integrated into
the waste management infrastructure, the addition of marine debris to these
plants would appear to be of negligible difficulty. Such integration is favoured
by decision-makers who are spared the expense of constructing new plants.
Existing WTE plants also confer power generation from waste with is further
attractive to policymakers. Precisely, once marine debris management is assim-
ilated with existing infrastructure, it represents a greener source of local power
generation once integrated into the existing system. While this is an attractive
option as there are fewer restrictions on what debris is accepted and marine
debris may be easily integrated into existing infrastructure, several issues with
its viability arise. Firstly, transport costs would be higher than other options
as very few WTE plants currently exist (Kothari, Tyagi and Pathak, 2010),
especially when compared to the more common recycling plants (DEFRA,
2014). Secondly, the volatile price of electricity is a significant concern for the
viability of using WTE. As the electricity price is strongly related to a range
of factors including spare capacity on the grid, and the localised demand at
different times of the day (Psomopoulos, Bourka and Themelis, 2009), there is
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uncertainty about whether there will be a consistent price level. Thirdly, the
combustion of marine debris could lead to emissions of noxious gases. Policy
makers have feared that these would have reduced health in areas proximate
to WTE plants and firms have feared that these would have an associated
emissions trading cost (Kothari, Tyagi and Pathak, 2010). These factors have
further led to a scarcity of WTE plants. However, these fears are unfounded
as evidence suggests that WTE emissions are 60% lower than using fossil fuels.
Specifically, converting one tonne of municipal waste into electricity, generating
approximately 600 kilowatt hours (KwH), is cleaner than generating the same
amount of electricity using a barrel of oil. For relevance to this research,
municipal waste is assumed to be consistent with marine debris (Lebreton
et al. (2018), Psomopoulos, Bourka and Themelis (2009)). Therefore, the
emissions problem, while having been a major issue against the construction
of more WTE plants (DEFRA, 2014), is of low concern. Finally, an argument
against the introduction of marine debris to WTE plants is the infrequent
collection of marine debris from passive system The Ocean Cleanup (2014)
scheme which suggests WTE plants inefficiently sitting idle. Therefore, while
a clean generation of power and integration with existing infrastructure are
advantages of using WTE, the low and volatile electricity price is a significant
factor in suggesting that WTE not be currently a financially viable plan for
the use of recovered marine debris from TOC.
Recycling.
Recycling is an attractive option for recovered marine plastics as it
improves the lifespan of plastics and therefore is an efficient use of existing
resources. Notably, manufacturers may prefer to use recycled plastics in their
processes to reduce eﬄuent which implies that recycling is an environmentally
friendly option (Bohm et al., 2010). However, a range of factors indicates
that recycling is not a financially viable use for plastics. Firstly, recycling
like pyrolysis only applies to plastics which reduces the effective yield and
introduces a cost in sorting debris. Indeed, WRAP (2012) reported significant
costs in sorting, preparing and preprocessing debris before it is recycled which
effectively reduces the profitability of recycling. The profitability of recycling is
also hindered by the fact that the pricing of recycled plastics varies significantly
with type and condition (Psomopoulos, Bourka and Themelis, 2009). The
condition of recycled plastics is critical as the effect of degradation of marine
plastics is to reduce the number of times they may be recycled and their yield
from recycling (Bohm et al., 2010). However, in a sample of marine plastics, the
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observed level of degradation was not sufficient enough to eliminate recycling
of those plastics, implying that this problem is limited (Lebreton et al., 2018).
While the degraded quality of plastics was observed, they did not appear to
be severe enough to reduce usability. However, for marine plastics that are
not collected and remain marine debris for extended amounts of time, then
there is a higher probability that such degradation effects reduce the usability
and thus the financial viability of collecting such plastics.
A discussion of recycling is incomplete without addressing the interesting
difference between recycling plastics for sale to manufacturers and recycling
plastics into products for sale to consumers. Wholesale to manufacturers is
an attractive prospect as TOC would only have to sell recovered plastics to a
recycling plant and then the costs of converting, marketing and transporting
the final plastics are owned by the plant. In essence, this option is far simpler
and reduces the workload and uncertainty associated with the design and
marketing of products (WRAP, 2012). However, if TOC wishes to earn higher
revenues, then it may brave the more uncertain consumer market and create
products from recycled marine debris (WRAP, 2009). This avenue requires
that the products be priced at a profitable level. Specifically, it requires the
public degree of support for environmentally friendly causes be sufficiently
strong as to inflate the prices to a level whereby the high costs of recovering
plastic from the ocean are met. There is some, albeit weakly related, supporting
evidence for this in Dikgang (2012) who reported increased willingness to pay
in consumers for environmentally friendly products. While the likely costs
and prices for each scenario are discussed more fully in the results section;
it is possible to note here that recycling is not likely to be a profitable use
for recovered marine plastics unless consumers pay a considerable premium
(Bohm et al., 2010).
This section has reviewed the literature on marine debris in four main
sections the effects, control, types and uses of marine debris. Starting with
the review of the effects of marine debris, this section revealed some ambiguity
about the fatality of the effects of marine debris on marine life. This contrasted
with the unambiguous damages suffered by different sectors of the marine
economy, notably including fishing and tourism (Mouat, Lozano and Bateson,
2010). Given these damages, this review then examined the potential means of
controlling marine debris. This section concluded by suggesting that the among
the suitable designs, TOC stands out as low operating cost and high capacity
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(The Ocean Cleanup, 2014) and is thus the most appropriate choice of scheme
for further examination. However, this finding was conditional on the types and
uses of marine debris recovered by TOC. The types of marine debris were mainly
discussed with regards to the 60-80% that is believed to be plastic (Derraik,
2002). However, the significant non-plastic proportion, mainly, discarded fishing
gear, was also discussed. This section raised the notion of a duality between the
financial viability of recovering valuable plastics, and the economic viability of
recovering debris that inflicts significant damages to marine life and economy.
This duality was further evidenced by the final section which discussed the
uses for recovered marine debris. Only WTE plants could make use of all types
and conditions of recovered marine debris although this was associated with
volatile electricity prices and a scarcity of plants. This scarcity was similar
for pyrolysis plants which are very restrictive in what debris they will accept
although their resultant oil is undoubtedly a valuable use for the recovered
debris. Another potentially valuable use for recovered marine debris would be
recycling although this applies only to plastics. Recycling suggests that marine
debris may be integrated into existing waste-management infrastructure which
reduces costs to TOC. However, recycling poses a challenging choice between
selling recycled plastics wholesale or commercially (WRAP, 2012) although
it is not clear whether either is profitable. Indeed, the financial and indeed
economic viability of recovering and marketing recovered debris using TOC is
uncertain and therefore the following section discusses the design of a suitable
methodology to assess this.
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Table 1: Summary of literature review:
This table summarises the impacts and uses of marine debris as described in the literature.
Seminal sources include: Mouat, Lozano and Bateson (2010), Leggett et al. (2014), DEFRA
(2014), Psomopoulos, Bourka and Themelis (2009), Fivga and Dimitriou (2018), Kothari,
Tyagi and Pathak (2010), McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011).
Impact Description Frequency
Environmental
Ingestion Marine life may ingest floating plastics mistaken for typical diet 30% of marine life
Entanglement Marine life may become entangled in discarded fishing gear 40% of marine life
Leaching Leaching of toxic contaminants when plastics degrade Unknown
Transportation Invasive species could be transported by floating debris Unknown
Economic
Lost fish stock The above impacts all reduce fish stock 86% of fishing vessels suffered reduced catch
Reduced tourism Washed ashore debris deters tourists Magnitude varies by location although consistently significant
Damaged vessels One incident per vessel per year on average Rescue costs in the UK ranged from $1.07-2.71mn annually
Loss of non-use value Loss of debris free areas Value varies with area and valuation method
Reduced water quality Leaching of chemicals and concentrations of marine debris Not currently assessed
Costs of clean ups
Recovery of marine debris at sea by TOC
Recovery of beach debris onshore
TOC: $0.97-5.03 per kg
Fishing for litter: $2.24 per kg
Beach cleanups: $50,710 annual average
Cost to installations Damaged equipment at harbours and ports e8,000 per harbour per year in UK
Use
Pyrolysis
The oil may be further refined, sold or used
Transformation of plastics to crude oil
Prices range from $ 0.42-0.98 per kg
Cost between $0.039-1.14 per kg
Waste-To-Energy
for generating electricity
Combustion of all debris
One tonne of debris generates $0.102 worth of electricity
Costs not stated.
Recycling
B2C: Pay PRF for recycling then sell final product
B2B: Sell to PRF
B2C: $0.09 profit per kg
B2B: $0.21 profit per kg
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Methodology
The review of the literature suggested a dichotomy between the financial
and economic viability of recovering marine debris. The following section
discusses plausible methods of assessing both the financial and economic
viability of TOC. To do this, a cost-benefit analysis was undertaken, and the
data for this was assessed using value-transfer.
CBA.
This section evaluates the merit to using CBA for this research. To
define, CBA is a technique used to assess the economic efficiency of a proposal.
Economic efficiency implies that the benefits of operating a proposed scheme
exceed the costs. Benefits and costs may, however, be defined in two ways,
financial and economic. Financial costs and benefits refer merely to the
private expenses and revenues of a proposal. Economic costs and benefits,
however, refer more widely to the social costs and benefits, i.e. the impacts
on society of a proposal. Specifically, economic costs and benefits include
welfare issues, non-use and aesthetic values and health impacts among other
items which are not included in the purely financial costs and benefits (Vatn
and Bromley, 1994). This apparent difference between the two notions of
economic efficiency was addressed in this research by assessing both the
financial and economic viability of TOC. Assessing both was advantageous
as the policy implications from each notion of viability are wide-ranging. For
instance, a finding of financial viability could precipitate new private sector
involvement in pollution abatement. Alternatively, a finding of economic
viability would suggest a different funding source such as governmental, charity
or crowdfunding. Therefore, this research assessed both financial and economic
viability. Indeed there are an array of similar examples in the literature,
especially in the area of environmental economics (Costanza, 2007). However,
the validity of assessing both types of viability is not without controversy.
While determining the viability of a scheme by comparing all the possible
costs and benefits is theoretically sensible, it is a technique not without its
deficiencies. One of the most notable opponents of the method, Ackerman and
Heinzerling (2002), refined their critique into the pithy summation:
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“Cost-benefit analysis cannot overcome its fatal flaw: it is com-
pletely reliant on the impossible attempt to price the priceless values
of life, health, nature, and the future” (Ackerman and Heinzerling,
2002, p. 1533).
This criticism has three critical elements, pricing the priceless, valuing
life and welfare, and valuing the future. Firstly, pricing the priceless refers to
the potentially erroneous comparison of market and non-market values. While
market values are both spatially and temporally sensitive and therefore are
volatile, they are also readily accessible which is analytically convenient. This
convenience contrasts with non-market values which also vary strongly with
time and location, but also with participant, elicitation method and object.
Given this greater variability in non-market values, it is not surprising that
comparison of non-market values with market ones is a notable criticism from
Ackerman, Heinzerling and Massey (2005). Indeed, this issue of valuing non-
market items is one that consistently surfaces in the related literature (Vatn
and Bromley, 1994). This was corroborated by Ackerman and Heinzerling
(2002) who noted that the various methods of eliciting non-market values do not
produce estimates that are sufficiently accurate as to be included in a CBA and
still be regarded as valid. This perceived inaccuracy stems from the problems
of valuing items in a survey or experiment as opposed to market values, an
effect referred to as hypothetical bias (Johnston et al., 2015). This critique
was mitigated in this research by implementing adjusted unit value-transfer to
ensure the accuracy of the final estimates, rather than relying on potentially
questionable methods used in the original studies.
The second critique from Ackerman and Heinzerling (2002) was to dispute
the focus on utility maximisation in CBA decision rules. Whereas maximising
expected utility and using a utilitarian decision rule, the greatest good for
the greatest number, is analytically convenient, it fails to incorporate any
sense of equity and morality. Instead, Ackerman, Heinzerling and Massey
(2005) suggested that incorporating distributional or welfare impacts would
be an improvement. These impacts have high importance in environmental
economics as natural resources have benefits for wider society yet may still be
exploited if only private costs are considered. An example of such an erroneous
finding, suggested by Ackerman and Heinzerling (2002), was the study which
found that the government should promote smoking as it was a cost-effective
way to reduce health expenditure. This finding failed to consider any welfare
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issues accompanying the value of life and health, and thus the valuations
were too low leading to an erroneous judgement. Therefore, Ackerman and
Heinzerling (2002) argued that CBA could not be a valid method if it failed
to adequately consider impacts on society. This critique is compounded by
the difficulties in estimating welfare impacts as evaluation of these non-market
notions is also the basis of the very first critique Ackerman and Heinzerling
(2002) made. To address this quandary, this research aimed to incorporate the
impacts of marine debris wherever possible in the CBA. However, as original
data could not be collected, previous estimates for each of the effects had to
be relied upon to satisfy this critique which implies a degree of inaccuracy in
valuing welfare impacts of marine debris in this research.
Finally, Ackerman and Heinzerling (2002) critiqued the valuing of the
future via the use of Net Present Value (NPV). Net Present Value (NPV) is a
technique which discounts and then aggregates all the values throughout the
lifetime of a scheme to allow them to be comparable with present values. Present
values cannot correctly be compared with future values for two reasons. Firstly,
there is increased uncertainty about long-running schemes which requires future
values to be higher to account for this uncertainty. Secondly, agents are strongly
presently biased and thus weight present values more highly compared to future
ones (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’donoghue, 2002). The solution to these
two issues is to compare present values with NPV where NPV is calculated by
discounting all the costs and benefits in the lifespan of a project (Costanza,
2007). In this context, discount rates refer to how strongly immediate values
are preferred to future ones. Specifically, a higher discount rate implies that
future values must be much larger than present values for agents to disregard
their present bias and prefer future values. Correspondingly, lower discounting
implies a greater willingness to wait for delayed values (Zhuang et al., 2007).
Given the differences that magnitudes of discounting make, the correct choice
of discount rate in this research is crucial. Using too low a discount rate was
criticised by (Ackerman, Heinzerling and Massey, 2005, 1533) as “improperly
trivialising the future”. This research avoided trivialising the future with
inappropriate discounting by consulting the literature for appropriate choice of
discount rates. However, this was complicated by selecting different discount
rates for the financial and economic effects. This research opted to use a
lower discount rate for the economic impacts of 3.5% compared to the 5% for
the financial impacts. The 3.5% discount rate for the economic impacts was
selected Zhuang et al. (2007) explicitly suggesting that a lower discount rate
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should be chosen for economic impacts than financial ones. An explanation
for this is that economic impacts have a longer duration than financial ones
as they may accrue more slowly and thus must be discounted at a lower rate,
and thus 3.5% appears to be a sensible choice (Costanza (2007), Zhuang et al.
(2007)).
Moving to the discounting of the financial values, this choice of discount
rate had to be both higher than that used for economic impacts and had to be
justified in the literature. 5% was chosen for the financial impacts to represent
bank lending rates for the representative period and sum. Indeed, many banks
were observed to be charging loans at ∼ 4% margin over the central bank rates
which would imply support for a figure in the 4-5% range. Further justification
for the selection of 5% was that in their review, Zhuang et al. (2007) reported
that discount rates between 2-8% had been commonly used. More specifically,
Costanza (2007) corroborated this by using a 5% discount rate alongside a
3% discount rate in their discounting of marine benefits. So while the specific
discount rates are justified, further criticism of using discounting is assuming
a constant discount rate across time rather than accounting for diminishing
preferences over time. As time periods pass, present bias weakens, so agents
are more willing to wait for delayed values. Thus discount rates have often
been observed to not be linear in time, such as the constant use of 3.5% for
each of the ten years, but instead, either exponential or hyperbolic which
would imply a diminishing discount rate for each additional year of the scheme
(Frederick, Loewenstein and O’donoghue, 2002). However, as TOC is relatively
short run, ten years compared to 30-50+ of some projects (Costanza, 2007),
the strength of diminishing discounting is not likely to be a strong one and thus
a constant discount rate is a valid assumption to make for this research. To
summarise, the financial impacts of TOC were discounted at 5% annually and
the economic impacts at 3.5% annually to reflect present bias and differences
between economic and financial impacts.
The above section concluded that it is valid to use CBA in this research
provided that appropriate measures be taken to ensure the validity of the
estimates used. This section discusses how appropriate steps were taken to
ensure the validity of the estimates. To assess the financial viability was
relatively straightforward. Firstly, data on the anticipated expenses of the
scheme are sought. These were readily available from The Ocean Cleanup (2014)
although required adjustment for accuracy. Following this, it was necessary to
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find data on the anticipated revenues of the scheme. Yields and costs were
available from the literature and prices were available from the market, and the
full range of sources allowed a weighted average to be estimated thus increasing
the accuracy of the estimates (Fivga and Dimitriou (2018), DEFRA (2014),
Bohm et al. (2010), 2WG (2018), WRAP (2018)). Finally, the estimates were
then compared in NPV terms to incorporate suitable discounting.
The above section has endorsed the use of CBA. The following section
discusses the measures used to gather data for use in this CBA. As primary
data was unavailable, this research followed the examples of Costanza (2007),
Johnson (1994) and Brouwer and Spaninks (1999), in gathering all previous
relevant estimates of the impacts of marine debris in a meta-analysis. However,
this meta-analysis suffered from small sample size due to a scarcity of literature.
Therefore, the purpose of the meta-analysis was to identify estimates that
may be suitable for value-transfer. Indeed, Brouwer et al. (1999) suggested
that combining a meta-analysis with an appropriate form of value transfer is a
‘second-best’ approach when compared to collecting primary data valuations.
However, without primary data available, meta-analysis combined with value-
transfer was chosen as a method to estimate values for use in the CBA.
Meta-analysis.
Meta-analysis collates prior estimates to synthesise new ones. Typically,
this would require including a large number of studies in a meta-analysis to
improve the accuracy of the final estimates by addressing shortcomings in each
study. However, this research is in a novel area with a scarcity of literature, so
here the best-practice use of meta-analysis was not to synthesise estimates but
to indicate seminal studies for value-transfer (Costanza, 2007). Therefore, the
meta-analysis in this research was limited to a small sample size which implied
a high degree of reliance on fewer estimates, as opposed to taking advantage of
several independent estimates as in a typical meta-analysis. To compensate for
this low sample size, this research adhered to Brouwer et al. (1999) guidelines
for the best practice of conducting a meta-analysis. Specifically, Brouwer
et al. (1999) suggested that to ensure accuracy, meta-analysis can, and in this
research should be combined with value transfer, the process of translating
previous estimates into being relevant to a new scenario (Costanza, 2007). The
validity and use of value-transfer is discussed next, although here it suffices to
note that the purpose of meta-analysis in this research was to identify studies
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for suitable for value-transfer, rather than for synthesising all the estimates as
typically used (Brouwer and Spaninks, 1999).
Value-transfer.
Value-transfer is a core part of this research as it allows values to be
estimated for use in the CBA despite an absence of data on social and welfare
impacts, unavailability of primary data, and the age of the original estimates.
For reference, value-transfer in this context may be defined as:
“Transposing monetary, environmental values estimated at one
site (study site) through economic valuation techniques to another
(policy site)” (Brouwer and Spaninks, 1999).
Value-transfer may be undertaken using a variety of techniques although
this research mainly focussed on the technique of adjusted unit value-transfer.
Adjusted unit value-transfer refers to adjusting the units in a method so that
the transposing of estimates from one policy site to another is reflective of
differences and changes in the original and new study sites (Brouwer et al.,
1999). The original policy site was the Asia-Pacific (APEC) region in 2008
where annual losses were estimated at $1.25bn using McIlgorm, Campbell and
Rule (2011) method. To transpose these estimates into being relevant to the
APEC region, 2018 requires adjusting McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011)
method to reflect the increased size and activity of the marine economy since
2008 (Hammer, Kraak and Parsons, 2012) and also to reflect the increased
frequency and value of marine debris in the APEC region since 2008 (Jambeck
et al., 2005). Therefore, the adjustments in this research were upwards revisions
of McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) method to reflect the likelihood of
higher damages. Moreover, upwards revisions of the economic impacts on
the marine economy are advisable as a means to incorporating the absence
of valuations regarding the social and broader economic impacts of marine
debris. Therefore to mitigate their absence, an upwards adjustment of the units
improves the accuracy of the estimates used in the CBA. While the specific
adjustments made are detailed in the results section, the following discussion
examines the validity of using adjusted unit value-transfer to estimate values
for use in a CBA.
Value transfer is a convenient although contentious method. Value-
transfer was hailed in Costanza (2007) as a convenient and cost-effective
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method of value elicitation where a primary data collection, which is typically
regarded as the ‘first-best’ solution (Brouwer and Spaninks, 1999), is not
possible. Indeed, this technique has support as several previous empirical
estimates in the field of environmental valuation have combined meta-analysis
and value-transfer to estimate values for use in a CBA (Brouwer et al., 1999).
However, despite the popularity of the method, Brouwer et al. (1999) noted a
series of criticisms. In particular, they cast doubt on the validity of estimates
from value-transfer as efforts to validate generated estimates have thus far
failed. This doubt may be further exacerbated where value-transfer is applied
to elicited non-market values. As discussed above, non-market values are
vulnerable to criticism, notably by Ackerman, Heinzerling and Massey (2005),
as the requisite methods of elicitation are prone to hypothetical bias (Johnston
et al., 2015) which implies that the final values to be adjusted are inaccurate
even before the inaccurate process of value transfer. This potential transfer
error is cause to doubt the validity of value transferred estimates.
Another critique of value-transfer regards the assertion that if the origi-
nal and new sites are not sufficiently homogeneous then the applicable value-
transfer method should be adjusted unit otherwise transfer errors and inaccu-
rate estimates arise (Brouwer and Spaninks, 1999). In this research, adjusted
unit value transfer was used as there are considerable differences in the APEC
regions 2008 and 2018 (Jambeck et al., 2005). Adjusting previous estimates
appears to be a crude manipulation of original estimates into being relevant to
current estimates, and this problem is further compounded by lack of guid-
ance in how to adjusted units. Thus, it may often appear that adjustments
are arbitrarily decided. Indeed, this is why many researchers have favoured
more complex value-transfer methods, such as benefit-transfer. However, this
research is constrained by a severe scarcity of previous literature which necessi-
tates reliance on McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) method for estimating
the damages of marine debris and this was particularly amenable to adjusted
unit value-transfer rather than more complex methods. To address the critique
of arbitrary adjustments, this research endeavoured to justify each adjustment
made to McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) method. Furthermore, as
McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) only estimated the financial impacts of
marine debris on the marine economy and not the broader social impacts, any
adjustment errors in this research are still likely underestimates of the actual
social, i.e. economic, impacts of marine debris. Therefore, while debatable, this
research implements adjusted unit value-transfer as a practical and justifiable
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method of generating estimates.
As a final aside regarding the accuracy of the estimates used in the CBA,
this research applied sensitivity analysis to the estimation process wherever
possible. This is particularly evident in the results section where ranges
of expenses, revenues, costs and benefits are produced rather than singular
estimates. The purpose of this, notably in the financial analysis, was to
increase the margins of error in the estimates. As this research relied on
value-transfer of a single study, it is instructive to consider all possible methods
of increasing accuracy in the conclusions which here implies a need for this
sensitivity analysis. The effect of this sensitivity analysis was to add strength
to the findings of financial infeasibility and economic viability, given that these
conclusions are shown to be robust even to severe deviations.
Summary.
To summarise the method adopted in this research, a cost-benefit analysis
was used to assess the financial and economic viability of TOC. To estimate
values for use in these two CBA’s, a meta-analysis was used to identify which
studies are most amenable to value-transfer. Indeed, the use of value-transfer
was a vital determinant of the validity of the estimates used in the CBA.
Specifically, adjusted unit value transfer was used to compensate for the
unavailability of primary data and the small sample size for the meta-analysis.
Whilst the specific adjustments and their rationale is discussed later, it suffices
to note that the accuracy of the method for eliciting estimates for this the two
CBA’s, one on the financial viability or profitability of TOC, and an expanded
version which determined the economic feasibility of the scheme, was bolstered
by use of adjusted unit value-transfer. This use of adjusted unit value transfer
allows the valuations used in the expanded CBA to be more reflective of the
full damages of marine debris in the modern APEC region. The following
section discusses the results from this methodology at length.
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Results
The following section calculates and analyses the financial and economic
viability of TOC. Firstly, the potential profitability of the scheme is explored
before the analysis is expanded to incorporate the full economic impacts of the
scheme. From this, the scheme is shown to be economically but not financially
viable.
Financial viability
Costs
This section examines the expenses and revenues involved with operating
TOC. The expenses, predicted from The Ocean Cleanup (2014), were subject
to adjusted unit value-transfer in this research. Following this, the revenues
from use of recovered marine debris were also estimated using the current
market prices for oil, electricity and plastics. After both expenses and revenues
were calculated in per kilogram (kg) and in Net Present Value (NPV) terms,
a determination of the financial viability of the scheme was possible. This
section concludes by finding that the scheme cannot be profitable with the
current high operating expenses and the low market prices for recovered marine
plastics.
Regarding the estimated expenses, the costs reported in Tables 2 and
3 were adapted from The Ocean Cleanup (2014) with four adjustments. The
first adjustment was that the original operating costs were re-estimated to
be variable with capacity instead of assuming a constant operating cost. The
assumption of constant operating cost was determined to not be valid in this
research as the category of operating costs included fuel, maintenance and crew
costs, which should theoretically all vary with the amount of plastics recovered
rather than being fixed with capacity. To reflect this change in assumptions,
this research adjusted the operating costs to calculate a constant operating
cost per kilogram. This required using the costs from the base scenario, the
$5,699,690 (Table 2), divided by the 7,000 tonnes of marine debris recovered
to calculate a constant operating cost per kilogram of $0.814 which was then
extrapolated to greater capacities to estimate all the operating costs, as seen
in Table 4. A constant cost per kilogram was chosen to reflect linear economies
of scale in recovering marine debris. While increasing returns to scale could
also have been assumed, there was no indication in the initial feasibility study
as to the existence or magnitude of such economies. In summary, the first
adjustment was to recalculate the operating costs to be variable.
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The second cost modification regarded adjusting the deviations used for
sensitivity analysis. The original data adopted an 18% decrease in costs for
the best case and a 16% increase for the worst case. This asymmetry was
removed in this research and instead a uniform 20% deviation was estimated
for both scenarios. This wider deviation allowed for a wider margin of error to
be calculated along with adding power to the ability of the sensitivity analysis.
This controlled for inherent uncertainty in the scheme by suggesting a range
of values rather than singular estimates.
The third modification to the expenses was the use of discounting. As
discussed in the methodology, discounting is an essential technique for compari-
son of future values with present ones using the technique of Net Present Value
(NPV). Where NPV has been oft used in the literature, a common challenge
has been the incorrect choice of discount rate. To avoid this critique, this
research adopted different discount rates for the financial and economic effects
and consulted the literature for guidance on the appropriate levels of discount-
ing. Specifically, a 5% discount rate was used to calculate the NPV of the
financial values, to reflect a greater preference for immediate revenues, whereas
a 3.5% discount rate was used for the economic impacts which stretch further
into the future. Indeed, discounting environmental impacts at a lower rate
than financial impacts is contemporary of the literature (Zhuang et al. (2007),
Costanza (2007), Frederick, Loewenstein and O’donoghue (2002)). Therefore,
the financial impacts were adjusted for a 5% discount, and the economic
impacts were adjusted using a lower 3.5% discount rate. However, if future
researchers modify these, it is unlikely to alter the conclusions significantly as
evidenced in Table 18.
The fourth and final cost adjustment used in this research was the esti-
mation of break-even (B-E) prices. Given the expense adjustments discussed
above, a total cost figure in NPV terms can be calculated. From this, dividing
by the total amount of recovered marine debris allows for an expense per kg
recovered to be calculated. Such a figure is instructive for a more straightfor-
ward comparison against revenues as they were typically priced in kg terms.
Evidence of this was the $4.19 estimate which was calculated by dividing
the NPV of the expenses, the $293mn, by the total amount of marine debris
recovered, 7,000 tonnes annually. Deviations on this estimate are also reported
in Table 3 for completeness. The following section now details the expense
estimates before estimating a NPV revenue per kg for comparison.
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Table 2: Annual costs:
This table reports the cost estimates from The Ocean Cleanup (2014) for a single year.
While decommissioning was only incurred in the final year it is hear included to spread the
cost over the entire duration. No discounting was used here as this is only a single year.
However, following results update this.
Category Base cost Best (-20%) Worst (+20%)
Capital expenditure $20,542,008 $16,433,604 $24,650,409
Operating expenditure $5,699,690 $4,559,752 $6,839,628
Decommissioning $1,916,340 $1,533,072 $2,299,608
Total inc. misc costs $36,160,611 $28,928,489 $43,392,729
Cost per kilogram 1 $5.17 $4.13 $6.20
1 Assuming 7,000 tonnes recovered per year
Table 3: Total costs:
This table reports the total cost estimates over the lifetime of TOC. Discounting at 5% was
adopted here to calculate the net present value of the scheme.
Category Base cost Best (-20%) Worst (+20%)
Capital expenditure $205,420,080 $164,336,048 $246,504,096
Operating expenditure $56,996,904 $45,597,524 $68,396,280
Decommissioning $19,163,400 $15,330,720 $22,996,080
Total inc. misc costs $361,606,112 $289,284,896 $433,927,296
NPV 1 $293,183,808 $234,547,040 $351,820,512
Cost per kilogram 2 $4.19 $3.35 $5.03
1 5% discount rate assumed here to exceed the 3.5% used for the economic
impacts. A 10 year lifespan was also assumed following guidance from
The Ocean Cleanup (2014).
2 The NPV estimates were divided by the estimated 7,000 tonnes recovered
annually. This capacity estimate is later adjusted for sensitivity analysis.
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Table 4: Updated costs:
This table reports on all the amendments made to the figures from The Ocean Cleanup
(2014). The ± 20% deviation is used for sensitivity in the cost estimates. Additionally, the
operating cost is recalculated to be variable with capacity. Finally, B-E prices are calculated
from dividing NPV by capacity. The conclusions from these scenarios are consistent.
Capacity Cost Base cost Best (-20%) Worst (+20%)
7,000 t/y
Operating $56,996,904 $45,597,524 $68,396,280
Totals $361,606,112 $289,284,896 $433,927,296
NPV $293,183,808 $234,547,040 $351,820,512
Cost per kilogram $4.19 $3.35 $5.03
15,000 t/y
Operating $122,136,224 $97,708,984 $146,563,456
Totals $426,745,408 $341,396,320 $512,094,528
NPV $345,997,568 $276,798,048 $415,197,120
Cost per kilogram $2.31 $1.85 $2.77
45,000 t/y
Operating $366,408,672 $293,126,944 $439,690,400
Totals $671,017,856 $536,814,304 $805,221,504
NPV $544,049,280 $435,239,488 $652,859,264
Cost per kilogram $1.21 $0.97 $1.45
1 A constant operating cost per tonne was derived by dividing the operating costs
($56,996,904), assuming base cost and 7,000 tonnes recovered, by the 7,000 tonnes
for a constant operating cost per tonne of $814. This was then extrapolated for
both the 15 and 45,000 tonne scenarios as well as the ± 20% deviations.
Table 5: NPV of expenses only:
This table reports the NPV of the estimated total expenses. The base cost 7,000 tonnes
capacity scenario is used as The Ocean Cleanup (2014) believed this to be the most likely
scenario. The NPV of the costs is $293.2mn although to truly be net value, the revenues
should be included as well.
Year Annual costs Discount factor Present Value
1 $36,160,611.20 0.95 $34,424,901.86
2 $36,160,611.20 0.91 $32,797,674.36
3 $36,160,611.20 0.86 $31,242,768.08
4 $36,160,611.20 0.82 $29,760,183.02
5 $36,160,611.20 0.78 $28,349,919.18
6 $36,160,611.20 0.75 $26,975,815.96
7 $36,160,611.20 0.71 $25,710,194.56
8 $36,160,611.20 0.68 $24,480,733.78
9 $36,160,611.20 0.65 $23,323,594.22
10 $36,160,611.20 0.61 $22,202,615.28
NPV 1 $293,183,787.29
1 5% discount rate used
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Revenues
Crowdfunding.
This section discusses the four possible revenue sources for TOC, assuming
their technology is useful. The first source of revenue is crowdfunding, and while
this is not related to output, it has been used by TOC before so it is possible
that crowdfunding could continue to be used. Crowdfunding has become an
increasingly popular method of fundraising, which mainly operates by asking
the public to donate however much they wish to a scheme. The flexible donation
amounts allow for an increased number of donors who may all contribute their
marginal willingness without any social pressure. Additionally, social media
campaigns and charity use of crowdfunding has allowed crowdfunding platforms
to host a range of sponsoring efforts for charities worldwide with great success.
As such, the TOC opted to fund both the feasibility study and initial research
and development for the scheme via a crowdfunding campaign. This campaign
capitalised on strong public support for environmental policies which had been
bolstered by previous such policies, an example of behavioural spillover effects
(Dikgang, 2012). Such strong public support was evidenced by the success of
the campaign that managed to raise $2,154,282 in 100 days. As the campaign
only lasted 100 days, it is however uncertain whether crowdfunding would
be a sustainable source of funding for the scheme over the ten-year expected
lifespan. Another challenge to calculating revenue from crowdfunding figures
is the issue of how the results of the first campaign may be amended. This
research uses the same ± 20% deviation as for the costs to estimate sensitivity
in the crowdfunded revenue. However, as the campaign only ran for 100 days, it
is perhaps erroneous to cite results from that for a full year. Future researchers
may choose to calculate an average daily crowdfunded revenue amount, by
dividing $2,154,282 by 100 days, and then extrapolating for as many days as
required. However, this method faces uncertainty over the duration of the
campaign. If the campaign runs indefinitely or for the full ten years lifetime,
there is no guarantee that the daily figure will remain constant over this
extended period. Therefore, this research opted to report the crowdfunded
revenue from the 100 days campaign as estimated funds raised annually for
lack of other estimates.
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Pyrolysis.
Of the three possible uses for recovered marine debris, pyrolysis appears
to possess the highest potential for financial viability. For calculation of
the potential revenues from pyrolysis, there is a range of plant size and
oil types which determine the profitability (Fivga and Dimitriou, 2018). To
approximately estimate the potential revenues from pyrolysis, this research used
the average costs (range $0.039-1.14 per kilogram) and the average oil prices
($0.60) with zero refinement costs. Following this, Table 9 reports that the
highest possible revenue from pyrolysis, using favourable conditions, predicts
an annual revenue of $4.7mn which is less than 15% of the annual costs of the
scheme. Precisely, the NPV of using pyrolysis is $15.34mn which represent a
little more than 5% of the NPV of the estimated expenses of operating TOC.
This lowly figure was under the most favourable conditions, and with more
expensive plants and reduced oil prices, this proportion diminishes even further.
Therefore, it is clear that pyrolysis is an insufficient source of revenue. For
sufficiency, oil prices per kilogram would have to nearly double and while oil
is a volatile commodity, such a favourable increase in prices is unlikely. Such
an increase in oil prices could potentially imply that it is cost-effective to fuel
the scheme by using pyrolysis oil in substitute for market crude oil. However,
this is not a financially viable plan as the market prices are significantly lower
than both the pyrolysis cost and the cost of recovering plastics.
Waste-To-Energy.
The elimination of pyrolysis as a profitable use for recovered marine
debris then leads to a discussion of Waste To Energy (WTE) as an option
for recovered plastics. However, similarly to pyrolysis, evidence in Table
8 suggests that the low price of electricity is not commensurate with the
estimated expenses of recovering marine debris and therefore this is not a
viable option. The viability was determined by assuming that one tonne of
recovered marine debris yields 600-kilowatt hours (KwH) of electricity, a yield
justified by empirical evidence (DEFRA (2014), Psomopoulos, Bourka and
Themelis (2009), Kothari, Tyagi and Pathak (2010)). As one tonne generates
600KwH, this can be priced using the current market price of $0.12 per kWh.
Therefore, one kilogram of marine debris raises $0.072 in revenue using WTE.
This low level of revenue is insufficient to support the costs of the scheme which
range from $0.97-5.03 per kilogram and therefore use of WTE would predict
severe losses, see Table 9 and Figure 1. However, this does not eliminate WTE
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as an option for recovered marine debris. WTE holds the potential to be
state supported as a relatively clean method of power generation which is not
reliant on fossil fuels and instead solves a waste management problem. While
there are some concerns about the toxicity of burning recovered, and possibly
degraded, plastics, the electricity from WTE has been observed to contain up
to 60% fewer pollutants than that from fossil fuels which confirms WTE as a
cleaner source of power. Furthermore, WTE is advantageous as there are more
WTE plants than pyrolysis and therefore it is easier to integrate marine debris
into the existing waste management infrastructure, saving costs when using
WTE (Sudhakar et al. (2007), Psomopoulos, Bourka and Themelis (2009),
DEFRA (2014)). However, the volatile but low market price for electricity
strongly implies that WTE is not a financially viable option for recovered
marine debris.
Recycling.
Following the elimination of pyrolysis and WTE, table 8 then examined
the profitability of recycling. There are two potential revenue streams for
recycling. Firstly, wholesale recycling (B2B) sells recovered plastics to a Plastic
Recovering Facility (PRF) who sell it on to manufacturers (WRAP, 2012).
Wholesale is an attractive option for TOC as the costs and risks associated
with the marketing and sale of products are left to the PRF where TOC would
only have to transport plastics and sell them to PRF’s. Selling to PRF’s could
be done via contracting to ensure certainty or selectively to take advantage of
competition between plants and volatile markets. A further advantage to this
stream is that PRF is more common than WTE and pyrolysis plants which
imply easier integration of marine plastics into existing waste management.
To estimate the likely prices to be faced in this method, a weighted average
of wholesale market prices was derived used prices from WRAP (2018) and
weights from Lebreton et al. (2018) who reported the frequency of plastic
types likely to be recovered by TOC in the APEC region. A weighted price
is a valid approximation of the likely revenues given uncertainty about the
types of plastics recovered and their market prices. This research estimated
an average price of $0.21 per kg (WRAP, 2012), and the revenues at this price
are insufficient to fund the scheme. This necessitated an examination of the
second potential revenue stream for recycling, commercial (B2C) recycling.
In this method, TOC would pay PRF’s to recycle plastics and then retake
responsibility for marketing them. This increases uncertainty, risk and therefore
costs on TOC although the higher risk with B2C recycling is also accompanied
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by a higher reward as the market prices are higher than B2B recycling with
a weighted average price of $0.41 per kg. However, the typical PRF fee, for
converting recovered plastics into final products, would be $0.32 per kg leading
to a positive profit of $0.09 per kg which is lower than the $0.21 estimate for
B2B recycling (WRAP, 2009). While WRAP (2012) disputed the $0.09 figure
and reported that B2C profits could range up to $0.54 per kg, this would still
be an insufficiently low price. Even assuming that behavioural spillover effects
(Dikgang, 2012) incentivise consumers to pay more for recycled products, it
is unlikely that sufficiently high prices to make the scheme profitable can be
consistently achieved (The Ocean Cleanup, 2014). Therefore recycling is not a
financially viable option.
38
Table 6: Weighted prices:
This table reports the weighted prices used for the estimation of recycling revenue. The
index values are various types of plastics. 90% of Lebreton et al. (2018) sample was PE and
so it is given the same weighting. The other categories of plastics were equally distributed
and so have the same weights here.
B2B B2C
Value Weights Value Weight
$205.76 0.9 $444.41 0.9
$37.41 0.01 $1,290.00 0.01
$68.37 0.01 $1,096.50 0.01
$38.70 0.01 $155.45 0.01
$474.72 0.01 $903.00 0.01
$470.85 0.01 $443.76 0.01
$290.25 0.01 $516.00 0.01
$354.75 0.01 $1,225.50 0.01
$125.13 0.01 $1,032.00 0.01
$251.55 0.01 $193.50 0.01
$457.95 0.01 $32.25 0.01
$78.05 0.01 305.73 $0.01
Total: $209.56 $467.23 B2C Source: WRAP (2018)
Per kilogram: $0.21 $0.47 B2B Source: WRAP (2009)
Table 7: Prices:
This table reports the estimated costs and prices for each revenue stream. Sources are
detailed in the text. Costs are stated as $0.00 where they have not been indicated in the
literature. Pyrolysis cost is assumed inclusive of any refinement of oils. Future researchers
may update these.
Type Cost Price Average difference
Crowdfunding $0.00 $0.31 $0.31
Pyrolysis $0.039-1.14 $0.48-0.90 $0.27
Waste-To-Energy $0.00 $0.102 $0.102
B2B Recycling $0.00 $0.21 $0.21
B2C Recycling $0.32 $0.47 $0.09
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Table 8: Revenues:
This table extends 7 and reports the estimated revenues from each of the possible uses of
recovered marine debris. Crowdfunding is an uncertain stream so should not be relied upon.
Of the remaining uses, pyrolysis appears to be the most profitable although the revenues
are still clearly insufficient to compensate for the high costs of the scheme.
Element Base prices Best prices Worst prices
Crowdfunding ($0.31 per kilogram) $2,154,282 $1,723,426 $2,585,138
Pyrolysis ($0.27 per kilogram) $3,927,000 $4,712,400 $3,141,600
Waste-To-Energy ($0.102 per kilogram) $714,000 $856,800 $571,200
B2B Recycling ($0.21 per kilogram) $1,470,000 $1,764,000 $1,176,000
B2C Recycling ($0.09 per kilogram) $630,000 $756,000 $504,000
Table 9: Revenues:
This table reports the estimated NPV of all the possible revenues from uses of recovered
marine debris. The range of revenues is $5.1-17.6mn which represents on average, 3.79%
of the $293mn NPV of the costs. This overwhelmingly shows that the TOC scheme is not
financially viable.
Year Crowdfunding Pyrolysis B2B Recycling B2C Recycling WTE
1 $2,065,840.00 $1,801,057.07 $1,399,440.00 $599,760.00 $666,400.00
2 $1,968,190.00 $1,715,923.07 $1,333,290.00 $571,410.00 $634,900.00
3 $1,874,880.00 $1,634,572.80 $1,270,080.00 $544,320.00 $604,800.00
4 $1,785,910.00 $1,557,006.27 $1,209,810.00 $518,490.00 $576,100.00
5 $1,701,280.00 $1,483,223.47 $1,152,480.00 $493,920.00 $548,800.00
6 $1,618,820.00 $1,411,332.53 $1,096,620.00 $469,980.00 $522,200.00
7 $1,542,870.00 $1,345,117.20 $1,045,170.00 $447,930.00 $497,700.00
8 $1,469,090.00 $1,280,793.73 $995,190.00 $426,510.00 $473,900.00
9 $1,399,650.00 $1,220,254.00 $948,150.00 $406,350.00 $451,500.00
10 $1,332,380.00 $1,161,606.13 $902,580.00 $386,820.00 $429,800.00
NPV $17,593,973.04 $15,338,917.57 $11,918,497.86 $5,107,927.66 $5,675,475.17
% total 6.00 5.23 4.07 1.74 1.94
2 5% discount rate used
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Profitability
This section concludes by rejecting financial viability. Specifically, the
tables above suggest that market prices are too low compared to operating costs
which are too high. Therefore, the scheme is not profitable. However, financial
viability ipso facto may be criticised as purely considering the financial impacts
and not the social impacts of the scheme (Vatn and Bromley, 1994). Therefore,
it is instructive to augment the finding of financial infeasibility by conducting
an expanded CBA to determine if the scheme is at least economically viable.
Figure 1: Summary of the financial viability analysis. This graph reports the estimated
expenses, revenues and the difference. The overall loss of $282mn, or -$4.03 per kg, rejects
the notion of financial viability. Indeed, the ratio of revenues to expenses can be simplified
to 1:24, a stunning indictment of the forecasted lossmaking nature of the TOC scheme.
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Economic viability
This section assesses the economic viability of TOC. Economic viability
includes the financial and the social impacts of marine debris. While the
financial impacts were valued above, this section aims to value the social
impacts. There is a range of social impacts of marine debris, such as loss
of life, non-use and aesthetic values (Lebreton et al., 2018), but the absence
of valuations of these impacts necessitates the assumption that the primary
economic impact of marine debris is the damage to the marine economy
(McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule, 2008). To estimate this impact, a meta-
analysis was first conducted to identify which prior studies are suitable for
value-transfer. Adjusted unit value-transfer was then applied to the seminal
papers from the meta-analysis to estimate the economic impacts for use in the
CBA to assess economic viability.
Table 10: Meta-analysis:
Sources and valuations used in the meta-analysis. Meta-analysis was used to identify the
unique estimates of marine debris in the literature. The seven below are the seminal papers
and of these, McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) and Mouat, Lozano and Bateson (2010)
are identified as viable for adjusted unit value-transfer.
Study Methodology Valuation Additional calculations
McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011)
detailed in text
Designed a novel function
APEC marine economy
Annual losses of $1.26bn
Tourism: $622mn damages
Shipping: $279mn damages
Fishing: $364mn damages
By sector:
Kildow and McIlgorm (2010)
but on a country, not regional, level
McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011)
Similar to
Represents on average 2.51% of national GDP
APEC marine economy value: $40.44bn
Not 3% as above
Average value of marine economy: 2.5% GDP
Mouat, Lozano and Bateson (2010) Collected original data.
Cost of rescue: e830k-2.2mn annually for UK
Cost to harbours: e2.4mn py
Cost to fishing: 5% of total revenue
Cost of clean-up: 37% rise over 10 years
Cost of clean-up: e18mn annually for UK
Estimates from North Sea rather than Pacific
These calculations are based on questionnaire
Takehama (1990) Used public data
Alternatively: Y6.6bn in 1985 prices
Damage to vessels: 0.3% of revenue
No indication if the 0.3% rule is up to date
The Ocean Cleanup (2014) Used meta-analysis
Refers to world rather than APEC region
Costs of marine plastics: $13bn annually
due to technical challenges restricting data
Costs are likely under-reported
Leggett et al. (2014) Case study of Orange county
A 100% reduction would save $148mn yearly
A 75% reduction leads to benefits of $52mn yearly
A 25% reduction would save $32mn yearly
Did not specify the clean-up costs.
50% of beach debris re-appeared within 3 months
Bergmann, Gutow and Klages (2015) Used meta-analysis Foregone tourism valued at e23-29mn
but did not quantify these
They note a range of impacts of marine debris
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While McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) function is the most notable
estimate from the meta-analysis, it is also instructive to note why this research
mentioned but did not adapt the findings from Mouat, Lozano and Bateson
(2010). Noteworthy findings included that 82% of fishing vessels had reported
marine debris contaminated catch, that 70% of harbours reported damages
from marine debris, that marine debris damages were 5% of total annual
fishing fleet revenue and that beach clean up costs had risen 37% in ten years
to more than $50,000 per area. However, as it is not practical to estimate
the number of harbours, fishing vessels or beaches at threat from marine
debris in the APEC region, these figures are less relevant to this research.
Furthermore, the data used to assess the damages from the marine debris
was based solely on respondents estimates which suffered from low response
rate, an average of one-third of surveys was returned. This low response rate
implies a sample size issue that casts doubt on their estimates. Their estimates
are more thorough than McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011), but less easily
adjusted and replicated and therefore this research chose to adapt McIlgorm,
Campbell and Rule (2011) method over Mouat, Lozano and Bateson (2010).
McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) established a novel function to
calculate the costs of marine debris in the APEC region. Their function
included three fundamental units.
Summary of McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) function:
Step one: Take 3% of GDP as the value of the marine economy
Step two: Take 48% of this figure as vulnerable to marine debris
Step three: Take 0.3% of this figure as annual losses.
The 3% value and the 0.3% estimate are the two units that were adjusted
in this research to increase the accuracy of this function.
Firstly, McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) assumed the marine econ-
omy represented on average 3% of national GDP. Secondly, 48% of the above
figure was taken as the vulnerable marine economy. Finally, 0.3% of the 48%
is estimated as annual losses to marine debris. However, before adopting this
function in this research, several critiques of the function must be made. The
first criticism was that Kildow and McIlgorm (2010) doubted the 3% propor-
tion of GDP and instead reported that an average of 2.5% of GDP is a more
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likely value of the marine economy. Furthermore, some countries specifically
report the value of their marine economy which makes use of a percentage
irrelevant for a minority of countries. Practically, this research reported the
3% value for comparison with the original figures, but a band of 2.5-5% was
also estimated for sensitivity analysis. This band of estimates was justified by
Kildow and McIlgorm (2010) who reported 2.5% as the average percentage
for the APEC region. However, they also noted that individual countries,
China, in particular, had significantly larger marine economies. Therefore, this
research opted to use 3% as suggested but also adjusted the units to include
2.5% and 5% as lower and upper bounds respectively for sensitivity analysis of
the values.
Secondly, where the 48% estimate of the vulnerable marine economy
stems from is unclear, however. Therefore the 48% proportion of the vulnerable
marine debris was not adjusted in this research as inadequate literature exists
on how to adjust it. This example of unadjusted unit value transfer introduces
additional uncertainty although this mostly unavoidable for this specific unit.
The adjustment of the remaining two units should however somewhat mitigate
the transfer error implied by using this proportion unadjusted (Brouwer and
Spaninks, 1999).
Third and finally, the 0.3% loss value is a point of significant contention in
the literature. The source of the estimate was Takehama (1990) who observed
damages from marine debris suffered by the Japanese fishing fleet in the 1980’s.
Two critiques of this arise. Firstly, applying a localised estimate for Japan to
the entire APEC region is an example of the unadjusted unit value transfer
Brouwer et al. (1999) criticised as being inaccurate. Secondly, the unadjusted
figure also fails to account for the growth in marine debris since that period
which has been unambiguously accompanied by inflated damages to the marine
economy (Jambeck et al., 2005). Therefore, it is clear that using the 0.3%
figure without further qualification or amendment is erroneous. To solve this
potential error, this research used a range of 0.2-0.5%, which is skewed towards
higher estimates. The range of 0.2-0.5% was skewed towards the higher values
given the increased prevalence of marine debris and growth of the marine
economy (Jambeck et al., 2005). A further justification for adjusting for higher
units is that as estimates from McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) method
are likely an underestimate of the true economic costs, an upwards revision
would somewhat mitigate the problem of not incorporating the full social
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impacts of reduced water quality, lost marine life and negative welfare impacts
on coastal populations which are not currently valued. Therefore using a higher
bound of 0.5% is an attempt to include these impacts. To conclude, McIlgorm,
Campbell and Rule (2011) proposed a novel function to calculate the damages
of marine debris but it requires adjusted unit value transfer to be relevant to
this CBA.
This section discusses some necessary critiques of the above method.
Despite the convenience of McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) method, it is
instructive to note that while their estimates purport to represent the entire
marine economy. It is, however, doubtful that this an accurate estimate for each
sector aﬄicted by marine debris. This is mainly because the estimated damages
refer to the entire APEC marine economy and not one specific sector and so
the estimates are imprecise. Furthermore, the estimates specifically relate to
the financial losses suffered by the entire marine economy and therefore fails to
consider the social impacts McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2008). The social
impacts include the value of lost and damaged marine life or the loss of non-use
and aesthetic value (Costanza, 2007). Nor is the value of reduced water quality
or the disproportionate welfare impacts on the populations who live closest to
polluted areas incorporated in their estimates. Therefore, the estimates from
McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) method are likely an underestimation
of the full economic impacts of marine debris. As valuations of these are not
currently available from the literature, the estimates from McIlgorm, Campbell
and Rule (2011) must suffice. Even by adjusting McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule
(2011) upwards to reflect the omitted social impacts, the resulting estimate
is likely an underestimate of the true economic costs although it must suffice
here. However, even with the use of underestimates, the economic viability
of the scheme is assured, and realisation of the true inflated costs would only
add credence to this conclusion.
This section discusses the validity of the estimated $465.49mn NPV of
the TOC scheme. Firstly, the use of NPV required discounting the economic
impacts at 3.5%, compared to the 5% discounting of the financial impacts.
While the precise discount rates used can be critiqued as inaccurate or unjusti-
fied, the effect of discounting is essentially one of scaling, and so the conclusions
are not significantly different regardless of choice of discount rate, see Table
19 for confirmation of this. Another possible critique of this method is the
reliance upon the estimated avoided damages which were used to represent the
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full economic impacts of marine debris. Precisely, the avoided damages were
calculated by taking the total annual value of marine losses, $1.95bn (range:
$1.08-5.42bn), and dividing this by amount of marine debris (140,000 tonnes
(Lebreton et al., 2018)), for a damage per kilogram estimate, $13.95 (range:
$7.75-38.75). This damage per kilogram estimate was then applied to the
7,000 tonnes assumed recovered annually. Using this method reported avoided
damages of $97mn annually (range: $54.25mn-$271.25mn). The headline
figures for this research include the point estimate of the $1.95bn estimate of
annual losses. This estimate was a simple replication of McIlgorm, Campbell
and Rule (2011) method. This example of unadjusted unit value transfer has
been critiqued as being wildly inaccurate by Brouwer and Spaninks (1999) so
the validity of using it to estimate economic viability in this research is weak.
However, this figure is merely estimated for consistency with the previous
literature. Furthermore, a range of estimates using the adjusted unit value
transfer and sensitivity analysis methods were calculated, and they uniformly
report the same conclusion, that TOC is economically viable.
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Table 11: Damage estimates:
This table reports the results from adjusting the units in McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule
(2011) method. This leads to the estimated annual losses to the APEC marine economy
from marine debris, of $1.95bn. This represents a 54.15% increase on the original damage
estimates in fewer than 10 years. This is consistent with the increase in plastic production
worldwide (Jambeck et al., 2005). Data for selected countries is also shown to highlight the
widespread damages of marine debris.
Element Value Notes
Total APEC region
Losses = $1.953bn
Vulnerable value = $650.95bn
Marine economy = $1,356.14bn
Total GDP = $45,204.85bn
as in Takehama (1990)
0.3% of vulnerable marine economy is estimated as losses
3% of GDP assumed to be marine economy
USA
Lost fishing = $258.5mn
Losses = $460.8mn
Vulnerable value = $153.6bn
Marine economy = $320bn
Follows Mouat, Lozano and Bateson (2010) method
Uses 5% of total fishing revenue as estimate for losses
Uses 1.8% of GDP instead of 3%
Australia
Lost fishing = $82mn
Losses = $107.1mn
Vulnerable value = $35.712bn
Marine economy = $74.4bn
Marine economy and fishing value sourced from APEC (2018)
Uses 4.8% of GDP instead of 3%
China
Losses = $1.16bn
Vulnerable value = $385.25bn
Marine economy = $802.6bn
Marine economy value interpreted from GDP
Data on fishing not available
Japan
Losses = $189mn
Vulnerable value = $63.12bn
Marine economy = $131.49bn
Data on fishing not available
Data on marine economy interpreted from GDP
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Table 12: Omitted estimates:
This table reports some of the valuations not incorporated in McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule
(2011) method. While adjusted unit value transfer can be used to approximate the omitted
valuations, it is still worthwhile reporting these areas which are in need of further study
and valuations. The absence of these estimates implies that the $1.95bn figure is likely an
underestimate of the true costs of marine debris. This lends further weight to the conclusion
that TOC is economically but not financially viable.
Category Estimates Proposal
Human health
has not been assessed
from leached chemicals
The impact of reduced water quality
and extent of reduced water quality
Researchers must first quantify the effects
Marine life
40% suffering from ingestion
40% of species suffering entanglement
to keep the current marine life and area consistent
agents Willingness-To-Pay valuations
CV techniques could estimate
Non-use value
areas of highly concentrated marine debris
loss of aesthetic value in
This refers specifically to
Table 13: NPV estimates of the avoided damages:
This table reports the NPV of the estimated damages avoided by operating the TOC scheme.
A 3.5% discount rate is assumed, consistent with the Treasury (2018). The resultant figure
of $840.5m, combined with the NPV revenues, is almost thrice the NPV of the costs which
implies economic viability of the scheme.
Year Annual damages Discount factor Present Value
1 $97,650,000 0.97 $94,329,900
2 $97,650,000 0.93 $91,205,100
3 $97,650,000 0.90 $88,080,300
4 $97,650,000 0.87 $85,053,150
5 $97,650,000 0.84 $82,221,300
6 $97,650,000 0.81 $79,487,100
7 $97,650,000 0.79 $76,752,900
8 $97,650,000 0.76 $74,116,350
9 $97,650,000 0.73 $71,675,100
10 $97,650,000 0.71 $69,233,850
NPV 1 $840,540,587.59
1 3.5% discount used instead of 5% for the financial costs.
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Table 14: Avoided damages:
This table reports the possible adjustments to McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) method.
9 final estimates are produced for the annual value of damages to the APEC marine economy.
These range from $1.08-5.42bn or $7.75-38.75 per kilogram of marine debris. These estimates
of debris are later used to calculate the value of damages avoided by operating the TOC
scheme.
Units: Estimates:
Marine economy (M.E) value
Total GDP: $45,205bn (APEC, 2018)
3% (Base) $1,356.1455bn
2.5% (Low) $1,130.1212bn
5% (High) $2,260.2425bn
Value of marine economy vulnerable to marine debris
48%
$650.95bn (Base)
$542.46bn (Low)
$1,084.92bn (High)
Estimated annual losses
0.3% (Base)
$1.9528bn (Base)
$1.6274bn (Low)
$3.2547bn (High)
0.2% (Low)
$1.3019bn (Base)
$1.0849bn (Low)
$2.1698bn (High)
0.5% (High)
$3.2547 (Base)
$2.7123 (Low)
$5.4246 (High)
Low to high ranking of estimates in per kilogram terms
$1.08bn $7.75
$1.30bn $9.30
$1.62bn $11.62
$1.95bn $13.95
$2.16bn $15.50
$2.71bn $19.37
$3.25bn $23.25
$3.25bn $23.25
$5.42bn $38.75
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Figure 2: Summary of the economic viability analysis. This compares the total costs
and benefits for the TOC scheme. The total costs included the financial expenses of the
scheme with the main difference being that in the economic analysis the costs were discounted
in the year they are incurred whereas in the financial analysis they were discounted over the
lifespan of the scheme. The total benefits of TOC included the financial revenues and then
avoided damages from operating the scheme. Following this, the comparison of costs and
benefits showed a positive total net benefit to operating the scheme which implies economic
viability.
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Summary
This concludes the results section. The tables above overwhelmingly report
that while TOC is not financially viable, it should, however, proceed as it
is economically viable. Financially, the high operating costs far exceed the
revenues. Economically, however, the avoided damages from marine debris far
exceed the losses from operating the scheme. Furthermore, as the estimated
damages are likely an underestimate of the true economic impacts, the economic
viability of the scheme is beyond question.
Table 15: Extended Cost-Benefit Analysis: Summary of the extended CBA.
Impact Value Range
Costs
Lost fish stock $340.5mn No range estimated
Costs of clean ups $293.18mn $234.54-652.86mn
Total annual damages: $1.95bn $1.08-5.42bn
Benefits
Crowdfunding $17.59mn $1.72-2.58mn annually
Pyrolysis $15.34mn $3.41-4.71mn annually
Waste-To-Energy $5.67mn $0.57-0.85mn annually
Recycling $5.1-11.9mn $0.50-1.76mn annually
NPV economic benefits: $721.57bn $407.85mn-1.97bn
Summary
NPV of entire scheme: $460.17bn $146.45mn-1.71bn
NPV per kg: $6.57 $2.09-24.50
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Discussion
Implications.
The implications of this research stem from the duality between the
financial and economic viability of TOC. While the scheme was not remotely
financially viable, the sheer magnitude of damages avoided by operating the
scheme implies a degree of economic viability in the scheme. This finding
implies that it is advisable to seek a sufficient source of funding to mitigate the
damages of marine debris. Thus far only crowdfunding has been used. While
it has been a popular source with nearly 40,000 individual donors, the revenues
were less than 10% of the total annual costs 1. Alternatively, the scheme could
operate in a way where donors could sponsor the cleanup for a specific price
per kilogram collected, thus directly linking revenue to operations. While this
has not been suggested for TOC, this method has been successful for charities.
Finally, either government or third-sector intervention is likely necessary to
support this scheme. One possible solution would be the marine economy
funding the scheme to mitigate the damages they suffer. Alternatively, the
major industrial, commercial and maritime polluters could also support the
scheme if the ‘polluter pays principle’ is adhered to. The precise funding
mechanism is left for future researchers. A final noteworthy implication of this
research is the finding that marine debris could relatively easily be integrated
into the existing waste management infrastructure. Regardless of how marine
debris, in particular plastics, are recovered, integration with existing waste
management infrastructure should be sought as a cost-effective method of
management. Recycling in particular merits further study as it represents an
efficient use of existing resources and where recycled plastics substitute for
virgin plastics, recycling would save fossil fuels and industrial eﬄuent from
the manufacture of virgin plastics. Therefore, future researchers are advised
to analyse recycling in particular as a cost-effective method of integrating of
wider waste sources, such as marine debris, into existing waste management
infrastructure.
1The scheme did only run for 100 days to fund the completion of the feasibility study so
it is not entirely accurate to suggest that crowdfunding cannot deliver revenue over 10% of
the annual costs. However, the 10yr lifespan and sizeable anticipated losses suggest that
crowdfunding cannot be solely relied upon to support this scheme.
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Limitations.
There are, however, a range of limitations to this study. Firstly, the
meta-analysis suffered from small sample size, due to lack of estimates of
the social impacts of marine debris, and this small sample size leads to a
strong reliance on adjusting McIlgorm, Campbell and Rule (2011) method.
Furthermore, the adjustment of units in this research could be described as
arbitrary. While using a band of estimates and adjusting the units upwards
was justified, future researchers could choose precise adjustments where this
research instead estimated ranges. A final noteworthy limitation is the strong
reliance on The Ocean Cleanup (2014) despite it being a feasibility study
estimated before the actual expenses of TOC are known. This reduces the
accuracy of the financial viability analysis although the conclusions are likely
consistent unless the TOC scheme radically changes.
Recommendations.
There are two key recommendations from this research. Firstly, the topic
of marine debris requires further attention. Specifically, the scarce literature
could be augmented by new willingness to pay estimates using contingent
valuation techniques to evaluate the social impacts of marine debris. Secondly,
the effects of leached chemicals from plastics on water quality, marine and
human health require further research.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this research has evaluated the financial and economic
viability of a novel scheme to recover marine debris. The TOC scheme proposed
recovering marine plastics and then marketing those for profit. However, none
of the revenue streams was forecast to provide even 10% of the expenses of
running the scheme, and thus the finding of profitability is rejected by this
research. Evidence for this is provided by the ratio of revenues to costs of
1:24 or in NPV terms, an estimated loss of $280.55mn over the lifetime of the
scheme, or -$4.01 per kilogram recovered. However, while financial viability
was rejected, economic viability was not. The ratio of economic benefits
to costs was 1:2.78, or in NPV terms, a total net benefit of $465.49mn, or
$6.65 for every kilogram of marine debris recovered. These conclusions were
reached in two separate ways. For the assessment of the financial viability, The
Ocean Cleanup (2014) provided estimates of the capital and operating costs.
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This research amended these in four ways. Firstly, the operating costs were
calculated to be variable with capacity rather than fixed. Secondly, the margins
of error used for sensitivity analysis were widened. Thirdly, discounting was
used. A lower rate, 3.5%, was used for the economic impacts while 5% was
used for the financial impacts. Use of discounting was undertaken to compare
values throughout time accurately and to allow for calculation of net present
values. Finally, break-even prices, or costs per kilogram, were calculated for
ease of comparison with the revenues. Of the revenues, average market prices
were used wherever possible. Finally, this allowed a comparison of expenses
and revenues which overwhelmingly reported that the scheme is not financially
viable. For the evaluation of economic viability, previous estimates of the
economic impacts of marine debris were sought. When a scarcity of estimates
presented itself, this research opted to apply adjusted value transfer to a
seminal paper’s methodology to allow new estimates. As with the financial
viability assessment, discounting and sensitivity analysis were applied for
accuracy and validity. All told, the resultant estimates of the NPV of the TOC
scheme are significantly positive which therefore implies the scheme should
proceed. The estimates used to calculate economic benefits, however, may be
critiqued as being underestimates of the true social impacts which could not
be adequately estimated here for data limitations. Regardless, the presence
of an underestimated economic benefit only adds weight to the conclusions of
this research. With regards to the conclusion that the scheme is economically
but not financially viable, future researchers must contend with a variety of
solutions. Crowdfunding support has also been suggested although this is
also likely insufficient to cover the schemes significant expenses. Government
intervention and application of Coase theorem may also be worthwhile avenues
for future researchers to explore. For now, it suffices to note that if you go
fishing for litter, you better hope the price is right.
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Replicability.
All the data used in this research are freely available from the sources
in the bibliography. Every effort has been taken to ensure calculations are
explained adequately throughout so replication of results should not be a
challenge. Differences may occur however if different figures are used for GDP,
marine economy, fishing revenue, oil prices, recycled plastic prices, or different
costs are assumed for the TOC scheme. Typically, upper and lower bounds
have been estimated to mitigate this issue.
Variations on estimates in text:
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Table 16: Economic viability of pyrolysis. An estimation of pyrolysis costs and benefits.
Pyrolysis plant data interpreted from Fivga and Dimitriou (2018). Cost of oil correct at
07/2018. Recovery cost assumed to be $5.28 (for 7000t/y with base costs).
Plant capacity (kg/h) 100 1000 10,000 100,000
Pyrolysis cost ($/kg) 1.14 0.34 0.066 0.039
Total cost inc. recovery ($/kg) 6.43 5.63 5.36 5.33
Profit to sale as: residual fuel oil ($0.38/kg) -6.05 -5.25 -4.98 -4.95
Profit to sale as: heavy fuel oil ($0.46/kg) -5.97 -5.17 -4.90 -4.87
Profit to sale as: marine oil ($0.73/kg) -5.70 -4.90 -4.63 -4.60
Table 17: Valuations:
This table reports the complete range of per kilogram estimates. This is done for ease of
reference and completeness in the results. This clearly supports the conclusions from this
research.
Scenario Price per kg Scenario Price per kg
Costs Benefits
Annual base cost $5.17 Crowdfunding $0.31
Annual best cost $4.13 Pyrolysis $0.27
Annual worst cost $6.20 Waste-To-Energy $0.102
NPV base 7,000 $4.19 Average Recycling $0.15
NPV best 7,000 $3.35 Damages low $7.75
NPV worst 7,000 $5.03 Damages low $9.30
NPV base 15,000 $2.31 Damages low $11.62
NPV best 15,000 $1.85 Damages medium $13.95
NPV worst 15,000 $2.77 Damages medium $15.50
NPV base 45,000 $1.21 Damages medium $19.37
NPV best 45,000 $0.97 Damages high $23.25
NPV worst 45,000 $1.45 Damages high $38.75
Average cost per kg $3.22 Average benefit per kg $11.69
58
Table 18: Summary of sensitivity analysis: This table reports the range of financial
estimates under each capacity estimate and cost scenario. The finding of no financial viability
is uniformly found.
Year Expenses Revenues NPV Loss per kg
7,000 Base $293,183,787.29 $11,126,958.26 -$282,056,829.03 -$4.03
7,000 Best $234,547,035.02 $11,126,958.26 -$223,420,076.76 -$3.19
7,000 Worst $351,820,513.62 $11,126,958.26 -$340,693,555.36 -$4.87
15,000 Base $345,997,566.90 $23,843,481.98 -$322,154,084.91 -$2.15
15,000 Best $276,798,048.33 $23,843,481.98 -$252,954,566.34 -$1.69
15,000 Worst $415,197,111.41 $23,843,481.98 -$391,353,629.43 -$2.61
45,000 Base $544,049,311.76 $71,530,445.95 -$472,518,865.81 -$1.05
45,000 Best $435,239,464.98 $71,530,445.95 -$363,709,019.03 -$0.81
45,000 Worst $652,859,236.38 $71,530,445.95 -$581,328,790.43 -$1.29
Figure 3: Summary of sensitivity analysis This graphs Table 18 to simply show that
the scheme may potentially be financially viable if they recover 45,000 tonnes annually and
have favourable cost estimates. However, Table 18 shows that revenue would also have to
raise significantly.
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Table 19: Summary of discounting effects:
This table reports a range of discount rates applied to the NPV of both the financial and
economic totals of the TOC scheme. From this it can be seen that discounting makes no
major difference to the conclusions of economic but not financial viability.
Year 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Financial impacts
1 -$34,192,656.36 -$33,505,604.75 -$32,854,713.75 -$32,203,822.75 -$31,552,931.75
2 -$34,192,656.36 -$33,505,604.75 -$32,854,713.75 -$32,203,822.75 -$31,552,931.75
3 -$33,926,222.92 -$32,877,565.19 -$31,901,228.69 -$30,961,052.80 -$30,057,037.52
4 -$33,620,884.11 -$32,282,941.50 -$30,981,159.49 -$29,787,859.32 -$28,630,719.76
5 -$33,312,800.56 -$31,685,573.05 -$-30,130,666.77 -$28,648,081.71 -$27,273,978.49
6 -$33,039,505.24 -$31,086,832.24 -$29,242,641.07 -$27,543,092.34 -$25,952,025.45
7 -$32,762,092.81 -$30,520,134.92 -$28,422,819.47 -$26,506,307.07 -$24,734,437.12
8 -$32,447,147.39 -$29,915,904.61 -$27,601,625.49 -$25,504,310.04 -$23,551,637.04
9 -$32,165,617.84 -$29,381,250.77 -$26,813,847.38 -$24,535,728.87 -$22,438,413.42
10 -$31,882,715.91 -$28,809,063.96 -$26,060,857.51 -$23,601,935.94 -$21,359,978.05
NPV -$334,786,084.04 -$320,185,121.00 -$306,584,110.43 -$293,899,788.45 -$282,056,829.03
Economic impacts
1 $63,022,794.91 $62,386,201.02 $61,813,266.52 $61,240,332.03 $60,603,738.14
2 $62,386,201.02 $61,176,672.64 $60,030,803.64 $58,884,934.64 $57,739,065.64
3 $61,813,266.52 $59,967,144.25 $58,248,340.75 $56,593,196.64 $55,001,711.92
4 $61,176,672.64 $58,821,275.25 $56,529,537.25 $54,428,777.42 $52,391,676.98
5 $60,540,078.75 $57,675,406.25 $54,938,052.53 $52,328,017.59 $49,908,960.82
6 $59,967,144.25 $56,529,537.25 $53,282,908.43 $50,290,917.15 $47,489,904.04
7 $59,394,209.75 $55,447,327.64 $51,755,083.09 $48,381,135.49 $45,261,825.44
8 $58,757,615.86 $54,301,458.65 $50,227,257.76 $46,535,013.21 $43,097,406.22
10 $57,611,746.86 $52,200,698.82 $47,362,585.27 $43,033,746.83 $39,086,864.72
NPV $577,164,206.37 $525,578,169.86 $480,483,772.40 $441,171,004.28 $406,399,772.68
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